The establishment of this bureau is already too late considering that, surely, many tragic traffic fatalities could have been prevented had it been set up and functioning.

While I understand that an element of necessary bureaucracy and a proper process to respect the privacy of road accident victims and their families might have contributed to the delay in setting it up, I'd like to input my ideas for an effective bureau based on some common and obvious factors that impact safety on our roads.

First of all, I suggest that the bureau be composed of four units: a Major Collision Investigation Unit, a Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Unit, a Road Safety Programmes Unit, and a Traffic Enforcement Unit.

Secondly, the bureau should mainly concentrate its efforts on general road safety concerns such as aggressive driving, speeding, distracted driving, impaired driving and pedestrian safety.

Finally, it should endeavour to work in combination with other stakeholders to promote safe driving, walking and cycling behaviours through education and enforcement while also supporting the engineering of safer road infrastructure and design to develop safer streets and speeds for people and vehicles throughout our communities.

Road safety is no accident.

                                                Nepotism, cronyism and clientelism

Based on the political scandals we have lately been having, one could draw up a very long list of malpractices that were flagged in various ministries and state entities, ranging from nepotism to mismanagement of the state-owned resources that the respective regulatory authorities failed to see, whether intentionally or negligently. The abuses often involved numerous financial irregularities concerning payments to family members of the minister or renowned cronies.

As a result, we had the odd ministerial resignation, albeit reluctantly and forcedly.

Yet one positive outcome of this scenario has been an increased debate on the issue of nepotism and cronyism. Such practices are hard to detect because they often happen on the fringe of legality and because there is little public information available on the extent to which politicians or their relatives and friends are connected to state-owned assets.

Regrettably, in Malta, cronyism has become as much a fact of life as other straightforward corrupt acts, arguably with a greater negative impact on the economy and governance.

These latest examples show that cronyism often goes unpunished or even barely noticed except when a scandal is revealed.

Transplanted into modern politics and business, "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" is no longer about exchanging mutually beneficial favours. Rather, it becomes the abuse of discretionary power for private gain, the very definition of corruption.

Combating the problem is complicated by the fact that in our country now, nepotism, cronyism and clientelism have become acceptable and expected ways of conducting public affairs and business.

However, such patron-client relationships inherently lack the transparency and objectivity needed to ensure that a protégée is qualified to do the job and performs up to par. Waste, mismanagement and more corruption usually follow. It is all too easy, though, to shrug off crony practices as a cultural artefact.

A deeper look at the underlying institutions should provide a more complete explanation, as, all too often, they operate in sectors where there is no rational economic justification for the state to be involved.

We must put a stop to clientelism as an electoral strategy or as a strategy for obtaining or maintaining political support.

With the continuing decline in people's trust in public authorities, the fight against nepotism and the need to ensure impartial recruitment procedures have never been so important.

                                    The Permanent Commission against Corruption

With the many corruption scandals that have saddled our country over the last few years, one would have imagined this Commission to be working in full swing and left breathless in trying to eradicate or, at least, limit the instances of flagrant corruption. Yet all too often, it seems to be existing in limbo. There is also a general perception that it tends to fail mostly in contexts where it is most needed.

Indeed, the functions of the Commission given to it by Chapter 326 of the Laws of Malta are vast and extensive and practically include every single corruption case involving ministers, parliamentary secretaries and other high-ranking government officials that were revealed with time.

Thus, I believe it is the public's right to know the number and nature of investigations that the Commission conducts periodically either on its own initiative or following reports made to it by any person. In fact, the law empowers the Commission to investigate any such case happening during the last five years.

In an age when transparency and accountability are two pivotal requisites for a functioning democracy, the law laying down that proceedings before the Commission are held in private and the information obtained by the members of the Commission, any person appointed in a consultative manner, or its staff cannot be disclosed except for the investigation itself and/or any report relating to the investigation warrants that it be revised.

While one appreciates that the names and nature of the investigation carried out should not be disclosed until it reaches the prosecution stage, it is, however, expected that some kind of information should be given to the public if this commission is to earn any reasonable trust in its role and functions.

We need something along the lines of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) commonly found abroad. Included in their tasks are prosecution functions similar to a law enforcement unit, something conspicuously absent from our Commission. Moreover, those agencies regularly report to the public as part of their accountability.

Our Commission's independence should not mean a lack of accountability, which is crucial to ensure its credibility and to build public trust.

I suggest that the Commission start reporting on its activities at least annually and preferably, publicly, in addition to reporting to parliament.