Coming to Enemalta from MITA was a shock.  At MITA, the Network Operations Centre could remotely control something as small as a cooling fan on a computer's hard disk in a Maltese embassy in Australia.  At Enemalta in 2008, the electricity distribution network was represented by four A3 sheets joined together with Sellotape, with pins marking its configuration.  The gulf was astonishing.

This was not a reflection on the engineers operating the network.  It was the consequence of years of government neglect that had allowed essential national infrastructure to fall dangerously behind demand.

Electricity generation attracts attention.  Power stations, interconnectors and gas terminals are visible investments.  Distribution is not.  Yet generating enough electricity means little if the network cannot deliver it reliably to homes, businesses and hospitals.

That network comprises high-voltage cables carrying electricity across the country (transmission), centres reducing voltage and directing supply to different areas (distribution centres), local installations reducing it further (substations), and equipment allowing operators to redirect electricity when faults occur (switchgear).

By 2008, much of this infrastructure was under considerable strain.

Enemalta's Electricity Dossier recorded seventeen distribution centres supplying approximately 1,200 substations.  Only four centres had systems allowing remote monitoring and control (Substation Control Systems).  The remaining thirteen provided limited information about electrical loads, equipment status and alarms.  Centralised network monitoring and control (SCADA) was therefore an operational necessity, not a technological luxury.

Eleven distribution centres were equipped with high-voltage switching equipment (33kV HMX air-insulated switchgear) identified as unreliable.  Serious failures were recorded at Qala, Gozo, New Hospital and Freeport. Replacement was necessary to protect personnel and the electricity supply.

The network also lacked sufficient spare capacity to maintain supply when a major component failed (N-1 redundancy).  Much of the 33kV network operated beyond this safety margin. A single fault could therefore interrupt electricity to areas that should otherwise have remained supplied.

Reinforcement required strengthening the country's main electricity arteries (132kV transmission backbone), building additional distribution centres and laying new cables.  Geological difficulties had delayed underground cable tunnels, holding back wider improvements.

The existing high-voltage cables between Delimara and Marsa South were particularly vulnerable.  Increasing demand threatened their ability to maintain supply if one failed. A major failure could interrupt electricity for weeks because Enemalta could not repair those cables itself.

The network also needed to accommodate Marsa Power Station's closure, additional generation at Delimara, the proposed interconnector and growing demand.

The investment programme included distribution centres at Mosta, Kappara and Marsa, additional high-voltage cables, undergrounding overhead lines, and a more interconnected network allowing electricity to reach an area through alternative routes (132kV ring network). Including the interconnector, the programme was estimated at approximately €226 million.

These were not discretionary improvements. Years of government neglect had made them unavoidable.

Earlier articles described the lost decade, roughly 1994-2006, when governments allowed electricity investment to fall while demand continued growing. The consequences were most visible in generation, where Malta found itself racing against the remaining operating life of Marsa Power Station. But the neglect extended throughout the network responsible for delivering electricity across the country.

Electricity infrastructure takes years to plan and build. Deferring investment initially appears painless.  The network continues operating, engineers find temporary solutions, and expenditure is postponed.  The consequences emerge when increasing demand and equipment failures expose the capacity and resilience never provided.

That brings us to the National Audit Office's review, published on 15 July 2024, examining Enemalta's distribution network planning and investment over 2014-2023. The NAO found that proposals for strengthening the network reflected what Enemalta could realistically implement with available resources rather than what was optimally required. Actual spending on high-voltage infrastructure was significantly below allocated budgets. Worse, expenditure followed a downward trend while electricity demand and temperatures increased.

The NAO also found that Enemalta had failed to publish and submit its legally required plans for developing the network (Network Development Plans). The regulator, despite possessing enforcement powers, imposed no penalties. These were not merely administrative shortcomings.  They concerned the very mechanisms intended to ensure that electricity infrastructure keeps ahead of demand.

The connection with the July 2023 blackouts is particularly important. The prolonged interruptions arose from widespread failures across the high-voltage distribution network rather than a single breakdown.  Extreme temperatures and peak demand contributed significantly.  But the NAO also found that historical investment had not been entirely sufficient to withstand the prevailing conditions.

The audit acknowledged that the network had generally been relatively stable before July 2023, that Enemalta faced difficulties obtaining contractors and materials, and that substantial investment followed the outages. Those qualifications matter. They do not remove the underlying policy question.

Why, as demand and temperatures increased, was investment in the infrastructure needed to withstand them declining?

There is a fundamental difference between planning the network Malta needs and planning only what available resources permit. Under the latter approach, inadequate resources cease to be a problem requiring resolution. They become the constraint around which the country's electricity future is designed.

That is the uncomfortable parallel with the lost decade.  The circumstances and equipment were different, but the policy weakness was familiar: investment decisions failed to keep ahead of foreseeable demand and risk.

The response must therefore go beyond announcing kilometres of new cables or additional substations. Malta needs published, independently scrutinised long-term network development plans, backed by financing, delivery schedules and effective regulatory oversight.  Investment must follow credible demand and climate forecasts, with sufficient spare capacity to withstand failures.

In 2008, four A3 sheets, Sellotape and pins illustrated how far network management had been allowed to fall behind. Technology can replace those sheets and pins.  It cannot recover the years squandered through neglected investment.

The lost decade demonstrated what happens when governments postpone decisions until the electricity system is running out of time. The NAO's findings raise the question of whether Malta allowed the same failure of planning to take hold again.

The clock does not stop because governments choose not to look at it.

David Spiteri Gingell is a Governance, Institutional, and Digital Transformation Consultant