MCCAA ensures that a healthy market is one where competition thrives, innovation flourishes and consumers benefit from greater choice and better prices. MCCAA's decisions may be subject to judicial review or appeal in Malta's courts, so the process often involves legal challenges. Sanctions typically include fines proportionate to turnover and the gravity/duration of the breach, behavioural or structural remedies, corrective measures for consumers, and acceptance of compliance programmes or leniency in cartel cases.
Recently, it was announced that Malta would go from three nationwide mobile networks to two. Epic had about 42% of mobile subscriptions and Melita about 22%, so if they combine, they achieve a majority share of roughly 65% against GO's 35%. Malta Communications Authority data places Epic at 338,367 mobile subscriptions at the end of 2025, and it has added a fixed-broadband arm. A third nationwide operator, GO, would be left as the only independent rival if the deal is approved.
Monaco Telecom bought Epic, then Vodafone Malta, in March 2020 at an enterprise value of €250 million. Vodafone said that was 7.8 times financial-year 2019 EBITDA and 13.1 times operating free cash flow, which implies EBITDA of about €32 million and operating free cash flow of about €19 million. Melita was sold by EQT to Goldman Sachs Alternatives in 2024/25 at about €750 million. This year, Melita has offered to buy 100% of Epic from Monaco Telecom, yet terms were not disclosed. Until approvals are in place, the companies say they will keep operating and competing separately. Melita is stronger in fixed; Epic is stronger in mobile, so there is a complementarity argument as well as an overlap. The real risk to GO is a stronger combined network that wins share on quality, not the loss of a price war.
With hindsight, in 2017, Melita tried to merge with Vodafone Malta, so MCCAA opened an in-depth review, with concerns especially in mobile and possible coordinated or foreclosure effects in fixed markets. The parties later said they could not meet the MCCAA's requirements and withdrew the deal. In that earlier case, the telecoms regulator supplied a technical report warning that a duopoly might not support stronger competition over the medium- to long-term unless users were protected by guarantees. This time, GO has asked the MCCAA for a rigorous, transparent, evidence-based and fully independent assessment, arguing that a move from three mobile network operators to two raises questions about prices, choice, investment and innovation. Consumer groups have also flagged risks of higher prices and weaker service. The parties' case is that the economics have changed since 2017 and that only a combined firm can fund fibre, standalone 5G and resilience.
Another merger in 2024, which the competition watchdog blocked, was Lidl's planned purchase of a Scotts supermarket in Żabbar. The watchdog warned that this would result in the German supermarket giant becoming too dominant in Malta's southern area. The purchase by Lidl of the existing Scotts supermarket would have allowed Lidl to strengthen its position in the grocery retail market within a 15-minute drive radius. This would limit market competition in the area. The Office of Competition completed a comprehensive analysis to classify grocery stores with a sales area of 200 square metres or more based on their ability to impose competitive constraints in the market. This analysis evaluated stores on price, range, service and quality, determining that 53 out of 87 stores meet the competitive criteria across at least two of these categories, thus classifying them within the relevant product market. Notably, MCCAA achieved a significant milestone by issuing its first-ever prohibition of a concentration.
To start with, let us discuss a cartel in public procurement where several construction firms repeatedly submitted pre-arranged bids for local procurement contracts. Meetings between competitors allocated tenders and produced "cover" bids to make outcomes appear competitive. Following a tip-off from a complainant, the Competition Authority carried out dawn raids.
Another example is price-fixing and bid-rigging. Here, if the authority finds an infringement, it imposes substantial administrative fines calculated on turnover and duration; typically, a leniency applicant receives immunity or a large reduction; firms are ordered to cease cartel conduct and implement compliance programmes.
The next instance is that concerning abuse of a dominant position by exclusionary pricing/conditions and discriminatory treatment. Here, the authority decided to impose a fine for past conduct; the operator is required to report compliance and may be subject to monitoring for a set period.
The fourth example is consumer protection concerning misleading online promotions. An online retailer ran a "50% off" campaign using a "was/now" price comparison where the "was" price had been briefly used only to create the impression of a discount. Post-sale terms (returns/refunds) were not clearly disclosed. Multiple consumer complaints triggered an investigation. These acts constituted misleading advertising and unfair commercial practices under consumer protection powers. In its decision, the authority ordered withdrawal of such misleading ads, required corrective advertising and refunds/compensation for affected consumers, and imposed an administrative penalty. The lesson to be learned here is to ensure that advertised discounts on products are genuine and substantiated by prior pricing history, and to make all fees and return policies prominent and clear; parties must retain records evidencing pricing and promotion mechanics.
Another interesting case is that of vertical constraints in pharmaceutical distribution. This case involves a national wholesaler which imposed contractual clauses on pharmacies restricting their ability to source from alternative suppliers and fixed recommended resale prices. Smaller pharmacies complained of restricted supply and reduced ability to compete. Such vertical restraints (resale price maintenance, restriction of passive/active sales and supply restrictions) may restrict competition downstream.
In such cases, the authority finds the vertical restraints to be anti-competitive and orders their removal; it imposes fines for RPM and requires contract amendments and compliance reporting. The perfect solution is to avoid resale price maintenance and unjustified exclusive or restrictive clauses, thus ensuring distribution agreements allow downstream freedom to source and set resale prices unless objective justifications exist and are proportionate.
Finally, telecoms consumers await a fair regulatory assessment of the proposed merger between Epic and Melita, with a view to safeguarding their rights.
George M. Mangion is a senior partner at PKF Malta