The administrative inquiry looking into the drug heist that happened on Armed Forces of Malta grounds placed the blame squarely at the foot of a soldier who was not doing his job of constantly monitoring the compound’s CCTV cameras.

The shocking findings state that the soldier meant to be constantly monitoring the container was not doing so – instead he was watching a film, speaking to his girlfriend on the phone, and even cooking a meal in the kitchenette.

His colleague, a Bombardier, was also asleep at the time, with the inquiry noting that while he was on “rest” at the time it did not mean that he could sleep.

The administrative inquiry into the theft of 132kg of cannabis resin was led by retired Judge Geoffrey Valencia and was published by the Office of the Prime Minister on Tuesday.

“The theft happened because the soldier who was on duty on the cameras monitor did not do his job, and instead of doing constant monitoring as he should have been doing he watched a two-hour film on his tablet with earphones, spent another fifteen minutes on the phone with his girlfriend, and even cooked and ate in the kitchenette – while not carrying out a single patrol to check the container between 11:25pm and 2:50am,” the inquiry reads.

“Had he done his job, he would have realised that the theft had happened or that it was in process of happening,” the inquiry continues.

Retired Judge Valenzia noted that these details emerged from the two statements that the soldier himself gave, where he admitted that he did not carry out constant monitoring and had exhibited shortcomings.

The inquiry also noted that the Bombardier who was working with this soldier was on “rest” – but this did not mean that he could sleep for two hours.  “Had he not slept, he would have noticed that his colleague was not on constant monitoring and did not do a patrol,” the inquiry states.

The army’s failure to consider 'residual risks'

Turning to the Armed Forces’ role in the matter, the inquiry reads that the Brigadier’s risk assessment didn’t see the need for a police fixed point because the area was covered by over 30 fixed point CCTV cameras.

The thirty cameras were manned by three soldiers day and night and were also armed with night vision.  Patrols also took place and there was passive security courtesy of the fence.

“The soldier in question had all the tools and a working system which he knew how to use.  It’s not a case that something escaped him and he didn’t realise,” the inquiry reads.

The system however did not work from both the active security angle – this being the soldiers and the patrols – and the passive security angle – this being the fence, the inquiry continues.

“The fence should not be considered just as a boundary line as was suggested by should have some type of protection, as how it is now is definitely not safe enough for a military base,” the inquiry added.

It continues that one cannot depends only on security cameras, and it seems like there was no contingency to cover for residual risks such as the fence being cut or human failures. “This is despite the fact top AFM officials said that they did a risk assessment and studied everything that was necessary to be prepared to hold the container in question,” the inquiry says.

“This is a serious case not just because a large quantity of drugs was stolen but because there was a breach at a place like a soldiers barracks which is meant to be secure,” the inquiry reads.

It also highlighted other shortcomings which, while not determining to the theft, should have been avoided.

Among these was that two skips partially covered the container, and there were some burned out floodlights in the area which were pending repairs for a while.  Both these issues were rectified after the theft.

“It was evident that the container’s locks were not enough, and in fact after the theft three bars were welded to the door of the container,” the inquiry adds.

It also notes that the soldier on duty should have listed the times when he filed his report, but the guard reports showed that documentation was not always filed as it should have been as times had been rounded and names were excluded.

“This is where the concept of residual risk comes in,” the inquiry states.

“In this case, it shows that those leading the organisation or those managing all that was necessary for the storage of the container displayed shortcomings because these residual risks were not identified, monitored or addressed, likely because there was an assumption that everything they had thought of was enough.”

‘The Minister’s role is policy, not security technicalities’

Referring to Home Affairs Minister Byron Camilleri, the inquiry noted that it is not the minister’s role to be involved in investigations and what security measures should be taken.

“The Minister explained that his permanent secretary had phoned him about a request for drugs which were in the courts’ hands to be transport to the AFM, and he told her ‘treat with caution’ and to speak to the Brigadier to sort things out between them,” the inquiry noted.

“From that day on the Minister was not informed about whether the Court’s request had been accepted by the Brigadier, or where the drugs were taken or what security measures were taken,” it continues.

“The Minister’s role is not to interfere in investigations or in what security measures should be taken.  There are people trained by the State itself to ensure the country’s security.  The Minister’s role is policy, not security technicalities,” the inquiry reads.   

Why the drugs were at the Freeport and the role of the Police and Court Services Agency

Speaking about the police, Valenzia wrote that he would not be getting into the investigative work that the police had done as the inquiry had to be led in such a manner that does not interfere with or prejudice the integrity of investigations.

He referred to the police’s role prior, saying that a fixed-point protection with the drugs while they were left at the Freeport was maintained by the police between 20 June 2025 and 16 January 2025, when the drugs were transported to the army.

“In these seven months, the drugs were not stolen,” the inquiry noted.

The retired judge commented that the Court Services Agency had followed standard procedure for the custody and partial destruction of the drugs once the inquiring magistrate ordered as such.  He added that the transfer of the drugs to the army happened with the inquiring magistrate’s approval.

The inquiry noted that the drugs remained at the Freeport for some time – between July 2024 and December 2024 – because the Customs Department did not want to keep the drugs themselves, due to fears for the safety of their workers, and the threat of industrial action.

The drugs weren’t all destroyed because the incinerator was initially on shutdown, and was then damaged and needed repairs which needed months to be carried out. In actual fact though, the incinerator was fixed within weeks, and no request for the drugs to be destroyed was filed.

The full inquiry may be read here